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1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical analysis on merger activities in the oligopoly composed not
only of private ﬁrms which maximize their proﬁts but also of a public ﬁrm which is a welfare
maximizer. This type of market is usually referred to as mixed oligopoly. The studies of the
mixed oligopoly go back to De Fraja and Delbono (1989). Merger activities in mixed oligopoly
have been analyzed by Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon (2003), Coloma (2006), Kamijo and Nakamura
(2007), and Kamaga and Nakamura (2007). Among them, Kamijo and Nakamura (2007) and
Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) focus on the stability of coalition formations of ﬁrms’ owners. In
the literature on private oligopoly, Barros (1998), Horn and Persson (2001), and Straume (2006)
also discuss the stability problem of merger activities. Along the lines of these works, Kamijo
and Nakamura (2007) and Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) adopt the core as the solution concept
of owners’ coalition formations. In these two papers, each of a public ﬁrm and private ﬁrms is
assumed to be an entrepreneurial one, i.e. every managerial decision making is carried out by the
owner of the ﬁrm in question. Kamijo and Nakamura consider the case of linear cost functions
and show that the core of owners’ coalition formations is non-empty. On the other hand, Kamaga
and Nakamura work with the model of quadratic cost functions. They assume that, as in the paper
of McAfee and Williams (1992), a merger among ﬁrms entail a synergy effect on the productivity
of the merged ﬁrm, and show that the core of such productivity-improving mergers is also non-
empty.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the core is still non-empty when we introduce
managerial delegation in the model of Kamaga and Nakamura (2007). In the literature on mixed
oligopoly, Barros (1995) and White (2001) provide the analyses of the managerial delegation a` la
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), or so-called FJS contract. In this paper, we extend
the model of Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) by introducing the FJS contract in the same manner
as in Straume (2006) that works with the model of private oligopoly and examines the core of
mergers. In contrast to the case of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, each ﬁrm’s owner(s) delegates the output
decision to a manager. Each manager sets the output to maximize her/his payoff deﬁned by an
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incentive contract provided by the ﬁrm’s owner(s). Our interest lies on which type of ownership
structure, or which type of merger, chosen by the owners will be stable. The result obtained in
this paper is striking but seriously negative. In contrast to the result in Kamaga and Nakamura
(2007), we obtain that the core of the owners’ coalition formations is empty in our delegation
model. In other words, if we additionally introduce managerial delegation in their model, none of
the market structures is stable in the sense that in any market structure there always exists at least
one ﬁrm’s owner who decides to deviate from this current market structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we extend the model of Kamaga
and Nakamura (2007) by introducing managerial delegation. In Section 3, we provide the formal
deﬁnition of the core of market structures and show that none of the market structures belongs to
the core in our delegation model. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Incentive contracts
We analyze a merger activity in the mixed triopoly, i.e. in the industry composed of a public
ﬁrm and two private ﬁrms. We extend the model set up by Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) by
introducing managerial delegation. A public ﬁrm is denoted by 0 and two private ﬁrms by 1
and 2, respectively. A merged ﬁrm organized by pre-merged ﬁrms i and j is denoted by simply
combining the notation just as i j. Each ﬁrm competes in the same market, i.e. producing a
homogeneous good. In this paper, each of the three ﬁrms is assumed to be managerial one, i.e.
each owner delegates the output decision to a manager. To make the analysis simple, we assume
that the public ﬁrm is owned by the government and each of the private ﬁrms by a single private
shareholder, i.e. each ﬁrm is owned by a single agent.
To formalize managerial delegation, we mainly follow Straume (2006). In each ﬁrm, an owner
delegates the output decision to a manager. Each manager sets the output to maximize his payoff
deﬁned by an incentive contract provided by the owner of the ﬁrm. Let qi and Pi denote the
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output and proﬁt of a ﬁrm i. In each ﬁrm i, an owner provides the following type of incentive
contract fi to a manager:
fi(Pi(qi);qi;qi) = qiPi(qi)+(1¡qi)qi: (1)
where qi is a contract parameter chosen by the owner (or owners in a merged ﬁrm). A manager
of a ﬁrm i can maximize her/his payoff by choosing the output qi which maximizes fi. This can
be supported by the assumption that the payoff to a manager of a ﬁrm i is represented as li+mifi
for some real number li and some positive real number mi.
2.2 Productivity-improving mergers and four market regimes
In the model of mixed triopoly, we should distinguish the following four different market regimes
(a) to (d) in accordance with which type of merger is actually realized among the owners: (a)
mixed triopoly, i.e. the case where a merger does not take place; (b) merger between private
ﬁrms; (c) merger between a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm; and (d) merger among all the three
ﬁrms. We start with introducing the regime of the mixed triopoly, i.e. (a). The inverse demand
function is linear in the total output Q,
P(Q) = a¡Q; (2)
where a is sufﬁciently large positive number. Each ﬁrm i (= 0;1;2) has an identical technology
represented by the quadratic cost function
C(qi) = q2i ; (3)
Consequently, the proﬁt function of the ﬁrm i (= 0;1;2) is given as:
Pi = (a¡Q)qi¡q2i : (4)
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Next, we introduce the other three regimes (b), (c), and (d). We assume that a merger entails
the improvement on productivity in a merged ﬁrm. Consequently, the three regimes (b), (c), and
(d) are different from the mixed triopoly especially in the deﬁnition of the cost function of merged
ﬁrms which reﬂect the synergy effect entailed by mergers. To formalize such a positive effect of
mergers, we followMcAfee and Williams (1992). If n (= 2;3) ﬁrms merge into one ﬁrm, the total
cost of the merged ﬁrmCm is represented as:
Cm(qm) =
q2m
n
; (5)
where qm is the output of the merged ﬁrm m. This type of cost function is also considered in
Heywood andMcGinty (2007a; 2007b), Nakamura and Inoue (2007), and Kamaga and Nakamura
(2007) and is supported by the assumption that the merged ﬁrm operates the plants previously
owned by the pre-merged ﬁrms in the most efﬁcient way. The proﬁt of a merged ﬁrm is given by
replacing q2i with q
2
m=n in (4). We summarize ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions in each of the four regimes
in Table 1, where proﬁt functions with superscript r (= a;b;c;d) denote those considered in the
regime r. In the rest of the paper, functions and variables with superscript r (= a;b;c;d) denote
those considered in the regime r.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
In our delegation model, owners and managers play the following two-stage game: in the ﬁrst
stage, owners simultaneously choose incentive contracts for managers, then in the second stage,
the ﬁrms’ managers simultaneously set the outputs. The equilibrium outcomes of each regime are
those derived by the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
From the routine backward calculation, for a given list of contract parameters, managers’
equilibrium outputs, each denoted qmri , are determined as follows. In regime (a), the equilibrium
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outputs set by the managers of the public ﬁrm 0 and private ﬁrms i (i= 1;2) are
qma0 =
1
18
µ
3(a¡1)+ 5
q a0
¡ 1
q a1
¡ 1
q a2
¶
and qmai =
1
18
Ã
3(a¡1)¡ 1
q a0
+
5
q ai
¡ 1
q aj
!
; (6)
where j= 1;2 and j 6= i. In regime (b), the equilibrium outputs of the managers of the public ﬁrm
0 and the private merged ﬁrm 12 are given as
qmb0 =
1
11
Ã
2(a¡1)+ 3
q b0
¡ 1
q b12
!
and qmb12 =
1
11
Ã
3(a¡1)¡ 1
q b0
+
4
q b12
!
: (7)
In regime (c), the equilibrium outputs set by the managers of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i
and private ﬁrm j (i; j = 1;2 with i 6= j) are
qmc0i =
1
11
Ã
3(a¡1)+ 4
q c0i
¡ 1
q cj
!
and qmcj =
1
11
Ã
2(a¡1)¡ 1
q c0i
+
3
q cj
!
: (8)
Finally, in regime (d), the manager of the merged ﬁrm 012 sets the following output
qmd012 =
1
8
Ã
3(a¡1)+ 3
q d012
!
: (9)
To derive equilibrium outcomes, we next deﬁne the owners’ objectives which they will maxi-
mize through their choices of contract parameters. The owner of the public ﬁrm 0 is assumed to
be a welfare maximizer. On the other hand, the owners of the private ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers.
As usual, social welfareW is measured by the sum of consumer surplus CS = Q2=2, and ﬁrms’
proﬁts. Let U ri denote an objective function that the owner(s) of ﬁrm i maximizes in regime r
(= a;b;c;d). In the regime (a), the owners’ objectives are given as:
Ua0 (q
a
0 ;q
a
1 ;q
a
2 ) =W
a = 12
¡
qma0 +å
2
i=1 q
ma
i
¢2+P0(qma)+å2i=1Pi(qma); (10)
Uai (q
a
i ;q
a
0 ;q
a
j ) =Pi(q
ma); (i; j = 1;2 and i 6= j): (11)
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The other three regimes (b), (c), and (d) contain a joint-ownership in the merged ﬁrms. The
owners of a merged ﬁrm need to jointly constitute the objective which they maximize through
the choice of their most favorable incentive contract to a manager. In the regime (b), the merged
ﬁrm 12 is still completely private-owned, and thus the common objective of the owners in the
ﬁrm 12 is deﬁned as the maximization of the proﬁt P12. On the other hand, in the regimes (c)
and (d), the merged ﬁrm 01 (or 02) and 012 are jointly owned by the owners of the pre-merged
public ﬁrm 0 and the pre-merged private ﬁrm 1 and/or 2. Therefore, the objective constituted
by the owners in each of these merged ﬁrms should reﬂect both two different kinds of objective:
welfare maximization and proﬁt maximization. On the objective constituted by the owners of a
public-private merged ﬁrm, we followMatsumura (1998) and consider the weighted sum of social
welfare and the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm. Let b 2 [0;1] be the shareholding ratio by the owner
of the public ﬁrm 0 in the merged ﬁrm 0i (i = 1;2), and also g 2 [0;1] denote the shareholding
ratio by the owner of the ﬁrm 0 in the merged ﬁrm 012. We assume that the shareholding ratio b
(resp. g) by the owner of the public ﬁrm 0 directly measures the weight on social welfare in the
constituted objective in the merged ﬁrm 0i (resp. 012). In Table 2, we summarize the (constituted)
objectives of owners for each regime r.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
2.3 Equilibrium outcomes
We are ready to present the equilibrium outcomes for each of the four market regimes. Taking
into account of the outputs subsequently realized in the second stage: (6), (7), (8), and (9), the
owners choose their optimal incentive contracts to maximize their (constituted) objectives. Tables
3 and 4 summarize the equilibrium incentive contracts q r¤i and the equilibrium outputs qr¤, proﬁts
P r¤i , and social welfareW r¤ in each regime r.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
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[Insert Table 4 around here]
3 Merger as a coalition formation and the core
It is the owners’ decision-making on mergers that determines which of the market regimes is
actually realized. Merger activities can be analyzed in terms of coalition formations among ﬁrms’
owners. In the analysis of coalition formations, the most fundamental and most important problem
is the stability of coalition formations. In the literature on mergers in private oligopoly, Barros
(1998), Horn and Persson (2001), Straume (2006) adopted the core as the solution concept of
coalition formations and analyzed the stability of mergers. Along the lines of these works, Kamijo
and Nakamura (2007) and Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) examined the stability of mergers in
mixed oligopoly. In the rest of the paper, we explore which types of coalition formation is stable
in our delegation model.
To analyze the owners’ decision-making on merger activities, we need to deﬁne the payoffs
to the owners. In what follows, we use the notation 0, 1, and 2 to denote the owner of the ﬁrm 0,
1, and 2, respectively, as well as to denote each of these ﬁrms. Let a 2 [0;1] be the shareholding
ratio by the owner 1 in the merged ﬁrm of the regime (b), i.e. in the private merged ﬁrm 12, and
also d 2 [0;1] be the distribution ratio of the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm 012 between the owners 1
and 2. We interpret that (1¡ g)d (resp. (1¡ g)(1¡d )) is the shareholding ratio by the owner 1
(resp. the owner 2) in the merged ﬁrm 012. The payoff to the owner 0 in a regime r (= a;b;c;d),
denoted by V r0 , is deﬁned as the equilibrium social welfareW
r¤ in the regime r, and those to the
owners 1 and 2 are (i) the equilibrium proﬁts of their own ﬁrms in the regime (a) and (ii) the
distributed equilibrium proﬁts determined according to their shareholding ratio(s) in the merged
ﬁrm in the regimes (b), (c), and (d). Since the owner of the public ﬁrm 0 is assumed to be a
welfare maximizer and the owners of the two private ﬁrms 1 and 2 to be proﬁt maximizers, the
payoffs deﬁned in this way will seem quite reasonable. Table 4 summarizes the payoffs to the
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owners for each regime (r).
[Insert Table 5 around here]
From the equilibrium outcomes presented in Table 4, the payoffs to the owners, (V r0 ;V
r
1 ;V
r
2 ),
are explicitly given as follows:
(V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2 ) =
Ã
49659
167042
a2;
4000
83521
a2;
4000
83521
a2
!
; (12a)
(V b0 ;V
b
1 ;V
b
2 ) =
Ã
113
392
a2;
5a
49
a2;
5(1¡a)
49
a2
!
; (12b)
(V c0 ;V
c
i ;V
c
j ) =
Ã
(6839¡4058b +483b 2)
2(109¡35b )2 a
2;
2(1¡b )(640¡408b +23b 2)
(109¡35b )2 a
2;
15(7¡3b )2
(109¡35b )2a
2
!
;
(12c)
(V d0 ;V
d
1 ;V
d
2 ) =
Ã
3(11¡6g)
2(8¡3g)2 a
2;
3(1¡ g)(4¡3g)d
(8¡3g)2 a
2;
3(1¡ g)(4¡3g)(1¡d )
(8¡3g)2 a
2
!
: (12d)
We now move to examine the core of market structures. To introduce the formal deﬁnition of
the core of market structures, we start with providing the formal description of a market structure.
A market structure is characterized in terms of coalition formations among the three owners 0,
1, and 2, and also of the shareholding ratios by the participating owners in the merged ﬁrm. We
denote byMfCgt a market structure composed of a coalition formationC with a shareholding ratio
t in the merged ﬁrm (if exists), where fCg is a partition of the set of the owners f0;1;2g and t
will be a in the regime (b); b in (c); and a pair of g and d in (d). A partition of a set A is a set
of subsets of A such that (i) the union of its elements is equal to A, and (ii) the intersection of any
two of its elements is empty. We allow the case where a partition of f0;1;2g contains an empty
set as an element. For example, the market structure of the merger between the public ﬁrm 0 and
the private ﬁrm 1 with the owner 0’s shareholding ratio b = 0:5 is denoted by Mff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5 .
Next, we deﬁne the inducement relations among the market structures. A market structure M
is said to be inducible from M0 via a coalition S µ f0;1;2g if, given that the coalition structure
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in M0 is represented as the partition fS01; : : : ;S0ng, the coalition structure in M is described as the
partition fS;S1; : : : ;Sng such that
Si =
8><>:S
0
i if S\S0i =?;
S0inS if S\S0i 6=?;
(13)
for all i = 1; : : : ;n. In other words, a market structure M is inducible from a structure M0 via a
coalition S if the deviant coalition S can generate the new structureM only through their deviation
without any cooperation of the owners outside of the coalition. We should give two remarks
about the inducibility deﬁned above. The ﬁrst is that the above deﬁnition of inducibility among
market structures allows the case where the deviation by the stand-alone coalition f0g (resp. fig
(i = 1;2)) from Mff0;1;2ggg2[0;1];d2[0;1] can generate the market structure M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a with any of her/his
desired ratios a 2 [0;1] (resp. Mf0; jg;figb with any of her/his desired ratios b 2 [0;1]). Since it
seems unreasonable to assume that the deviant owner has a decisive inﬂuence on the shareholding
ratios in the merged ﬁrm organized by the rest of the owners, we restrict admissible inducement
relations as follows: in the case of the deviation by f0g from Mff0;1;2ggg2[0;1];d2[0;1],
Mff0g;f1;2gga with a = d (14)
is solely inducible; and in the case of the deviation by f1g (resp. f2g) from Mff0;1;2ggg2[0;1];d2[0;1],
Mff0;1g;f2ggb with b =
g
g+(1¡ g)d
³
resp. Mff0;2g;f1ggb with b =
g
g+(1¡ g)(1¡d )
´
(15)
is solely inducible, i.e. the shareholding ratios are determined according to those of the two
owners in the merged ﬁrm 012. In the rest of the paper, we restrict our analysis to the admissible
inducement relations and use the terms “inducement relations” and “inducible” to mean those
restricted to the admissible ones. The second remark is that our deﬁnition does not allow the case
where market structure of the mixed triopoly is directly induced from the market structure of the
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merger among all the three ﬁrms, i.e. that of the regime (d). We eliminate such a case to make the
analysis simple. However, as will be shown later, this simpliﬁcation never detracts the generality
and relevance of our core analysis.
A market structure M is said to block a market structure M0 via a coalition S µ f0;1;2g if (i)
M is inducible from M0 via S, and (ii) Vi >V 0i for all i 2 S, where Vi (resp. V 0i ) denotes the payoff
to i in M (resp. in M0). By deﬁnition, if a market structure M blocks M0 via a coalition S, each of
the owners in the coalition S has an incentive to deviate from M0 and induce M. Consequently, a
blocked market structure will never be realized. We write M ÂS M0 to mean M blocks M0 via S.
We are now ready to deﬁne the core of the market structures.
The core is the set of market structures each of which is never blocked by any other market
structure. In other words, a market structure M belongs to the core if there is no market structure
M0 such that M0 ÂS M for some S µ f0;1;2g. We denote the core of the market structures by
Co. By deﬁnition, if a market structure is in the core, all of the three owners have no incentive to
deviate and to induce any other market structure. In this sense, a market structure in the core is
regarded as a stable one.
Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) has shown that the core is non-empty in the case of en-
trepreneurial ﬁrms, and that the core consists solely of the market structures of the merger be-
tween the public ﬁrm 0 and one of the two private ﬁrms with the share ratio near around 0.57.
In contrast to their result, we obtain the following striking but serious impossibility result in our
delegation model.
Proposition 1. None of the market structures belongs to the core, i.e. Co=?.
Proof. The proof proceeds through a series of claims (a) to (d). In each claim (r) (= a, b, c, d),
it will be shown that, for any market structureM in the regime (r), we can ﬁnd some other market
structure which blocks M via some coalition S µ f0;1;2g, i.e. we prove by explicitly presenting
M0 and S such that M0 ÂS M.
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Claim (a): Mff0g;f1;2gga2(a ;a¯) Âf1;2g Mff0g;f1g;f2gg, where a = 3920083521 and a¯ = 4432183521 .
This claim is easily checked as follows:
V b1 (a)¡V a1 =
¡5a2(39200¡83521a)
4092529
> 0 , a > 39200
83521
; (16)
V b2 (a)¡V a2 =
5a2(44321¡83521a)
4092529
> 0 , a < 44321
83521
: (17)
Thus, the joint deviation by f0;1g will take place if a 2 ¡3920083521 ; 4432183521¢.
Claim (b): (i) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf1g Mff0g;f1;2gga in any case of a 2
£
0; 3920083521
¢
;
(ii) Mff0;ig;f jggb=1=3 Âf0;1g M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a in any case of a 2
£39200
83521 ;
44321
83521
¤
;
(iii)Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf2g Mff0g;f1;2gga in any case of a 2
¡44321
83521 ;1
¤
.
The statements (i) and (iii) are straightforward from the fact that the equivalence assertions in
(16) and (17) still hold when we reverse the inequality signs. We provide the proof of (ii). Let,
without loss of generality, i= 1. For the owner 0, we have
V c0 (b )¡V b0 =
¡a2(2109¡66822b +43757b 2)
392(109¡35b )2 > 0, b >
4773¡164p777
6251
¼ 0:0322422:
(18)
On the other hand, for the owner of the ﬁrm 1, we have
V c1 (b )jb= 13 ¡V
b
1 (a)ja= 4432183521 =
4486643171a2
261709044492
> 0: (19)
Note that 4432183521 = argmaxa2[ 3920083521 ; 4432183521 ]V
b
1 (a). Thus, by (18) and (19),M
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=1=3 Âf0;1gM
ff0g;f1;2gg
a
in any case of a 2 [3920083521 ; 4432183521 ].
Claim (c): (i) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âfig Mff0;ig;f jggb in any case of b 2
¡3
5 ;1
¤
;
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(ii) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf0g Mff0;ig;f jggb in any case of b 2
£
0; 35
¤
.
Let, without loss of generality, i= 1. For the owner 1, we have
V a1 ¡V c1 (b ) =
¡2a2(29691440¡72270008b +33547551b 2¡1920983b 3)
83521(109¡35b )2 > 0;
8b 2
³
0:543873; 1
i
¶
µ
3
5
; 1
¸
: (20)
On the other hand, taking into account that d(V
a
0¡V c0 (b ))
db =
¡169a2(111¡112b )
(109¡35b )3 < 0 for all b 2 [0; 35 ],
we have
V a0 ¡V c0 (b ) =
2a2(4699615¡9992488b +5122908b 2)
83521(109¡35b )2 > 0,8b 2
·
0;
3
5
¸
; (21)
sinceV a0 ¡V c0 (b )jb= 35 =
13709227
8084832800a
2 > 0. Thus, the statement (i) follows from (20), and (ii) does
from (21), respectively.
Claim (d): (i) Mff0;1g;f2ggb=g Âf0;1g M
ff0;1;2gg
g;d in any case of g 2
£
0; 45
¢
and d 2 [0;1];
(ii) Mff0;1g;f2ggb= gg+(1¡g)d
Âf2g Mff0;1;2ggg;d in any case of g 2
£4
5 ;1
¤
and d 2 [0;1].
We begin with the proof of (i). For the payoff to the owner of the public ﬁrm 0, we have
V c0 (b )jb=g ¡V d0 (g)> 0; 8g <
4
5
; (22)
from the fact that
d(V c0 (b )jb=g¡V d0 (g))
dg =
¡a2(25645335¡48758498g+29986128g2¡7514154g3+661689g4)
(8¡3g)3(109¡35g)3 < 0 for
all g 2 [0;1] and V c0 (b )jb= 45 ¡V
d
0 (g)jg= 45 =
202087a2
257191200 > 0. For the payoff to the owner of the
private ﬁrm 1, we also obtain,
V c1 (b )jb=g ¡V d1 (g;d )jd= 12 > 0; 8g <
4
5
; (23)
13
because we have
d
¡
V c1 (b )jb=g ¡V d1 (g;d )jd= 12
¢
dg
=
¡a2
2417873952¡52618843g+67857663g2¡39401297g3
+11066013g4¡1507788g5+86940g6
35
2(8¡3g)3(109¡35g)3 < 0; 8g 2 [0;1]; (24)
andV c1 (b )jb= 45¡V
d
1 (g;d )jg= 45 ;d= 12 =
28043a2
5953500 > 0. Thus, by (22) and (23), we obtainM
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=g Âf0;1g
Mff0;1;2gg
g< 45 ;d=
1
2
. Since in the cases of d 6= 12 either of the two owners 1 and 2 will receive smaller payoff
than in the case of d = 12 , we can apply the above argument to the owner with the smaller payoff
and complete the proof of (i).
Next, we prove (ii). Because d = 0 is the most favorable case of d for the owner 2 and
dV c2 (b )
db =
¡2460a2(7¡3b )
(109¡35b )3 < 0 for all b 2 [0;1], it is sufﬁcient to show that M
ff0;1;2gg
g¸ 45 ;d=0
is blocked by
Mff0;1g;f2ggb= gg+(1¡g)d
, i.e. byMff0;1g;f2ggb=1 , via f2g. InM
ff0;1;2gg
g¸ 45 ;d=0
, the payoff to the owner of the private ﬁrm
2 is given as:
V d2 (g;d )jd=0 =
3a2(1¡ g)(4¡3g)
(8¡3g)2 : (25)
From the fact that dV
d
2 (g;d )jd=0
dg =
¡3a2(32¡27g)
(8¡3g)3 < 0 for all g 2
£4
5 ;1
¤
,
max
g2[ 45 ;1]
V d2 (g;d )jd=0 =V d
³4
5
;0
´
=
3a2
98
: (26)
On the other hand, in the market structureMff0;1g;f2ggb=1 , the payoff to the owner of the private ﬁrm
2 is
V c2 (b )jb=1 =
15a2(7¡3b )2
(109¡35b )2
¯¯¯
b=1
=
60a2
1369
>
3a2
98
= max
g2[ 45 ;1]
V d2 (g;d )jd=0; (27)
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Thus, Mff0;1g;f2ggb=1 Âf2g M
ff0;1;2gg
g;d=0 for any case of g 2
£4
5 ;1
¤
. ¥
By the deﬁnition of the core, none of the market structures is stable in the sense that there
always exists at least one owner who wants to deviate and induce a new market structure: in the
regime (a), the private owners 1 and 2; in (b), the coalition of the owners 0 and i (= 1;2) or a
single private owner j (= 1;2); in (c), either of the owners 0 and i (= 1;2); and in (d), the two
owners 0 and i (= 1;2), or a single private owner j (= 1;2). In what follows, we explain the
reasoning behind the results we stated as claims in the proof of our proposition.
Our claim (a) tells that the market structure of the mixed triopoly is blocked by those structures
of the regime (b) with a 2 (a; a¯). In the regime (b), the private merged ﬁrm 12 enjoys improved
production technology represented by the cost function C(q12) = 12q
2
12 and competes with the
public ﬁrm 0 whose production technology is less efﬁcient than the ﬁrm 12, while every ﬁrm in the
regime (a) has a symmetric production technology. Faced with this asymmetry of technologies in
the regime (b), the owner of the public ﬁrm, a welfare maximizer, chooses the contract parameter
q b0 larger than the one in the regime (a) (note that q
b
0 ¡q a0 = 40a(7+a)(289+47a) > 0) to induce more of
the production by the merged ﬁrm 12 which now operating more efﬁcient production technology.
Consequently, both of the two owners of the merged ﬁrm 12 can achieve higher payoffs in the
regime (b) than in the regime (a).
In their model of mixed triopoly of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) show
that the market structures of the regime (c) with b 2 [0:56950;0:56996] belong to the core, where
0:56996 (resp. 0:56950) is the highest (resp. lowest) value of b that the owner of the private ﬁrm
i (resp. the public ﬁrm 0) agrees on the merger. Our claim (c), however, tells that, in the case of
managerial ﬁrms, any market structure of the regime (c) is blocked by the market structure of the
mixed triopoly. To explain the reasoning behind this result, we compare the equilibrium outcomes
obtained in their entrepreneurial model and those in our managerial model. We use a superscript
e to denote equilibrium outcomes in the entrepreneurial model. In the entrepreneurial model of
Kamaga and Nakamura (2007), the equilibrium outputs of the public ﬁrm 0 and private ﬁrm i and
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the equilibrium proﬁt of the private ﬁrm i in the regime (a) are obtained as follows:
qae0 =
3
13
a; qaei =
2
13
a; Paei =
8
169
a2;
and the equilibrium outputs of the merged ﬁrm 0i and private ﬁrm j and the equilibrium proﬁt of
the merged ﬁrm 0i in the regime (c) are given as:
qce0i =
3
11¡4b a; q
ce
j =
2¡b
11¡4b a; P
ae
0i =
9(3¡2b )
2(11¡4b )2a
2:
Comparing these outcomes with those obtained in our model, we will observe the following
changes brought by managerial delegation: (i) in the regime (a), the output of the private ﬁrm
i increases
¡
qa¤i ¡qaei = 723757a
¢
while the output of the public ﬁrm, now operated by a manager
whose objective is not welfare maximization, decreases (qa¤0 ¡qae0 =¡ 1003757a); (ii) consequently,
the proﬁt of the private ﬁrm i in the regime (a) becomes higher in the managerial case than in
the entrepreneurial case (Pa¤i ¡Paei = 783214115049a2); (iii) but in the regime (c) where the merged
ﬁrm 0i increases the output for the case of relatively small b (qc¤0i ¡ qce0i = (5¡b )(5¡8b )(11¡4b )(109¡35b )a >
0 for all b 2 [0; 58)), the competitor of the merged ﬁrm 0i is not a public ﬁrm but solely the pri-
vate ﬁrm j which also increases the output (qc¤j ¡qcej = 13¡4b+b
2
(11¡4b )(109¡35b )a > 0 for all b 2 [0;1]),
and such an expansion of the output by the private ﬁrm j will decrease the proﬁt of the merged
ﬁrm 0i for almost all cases of b (P c¤0i ¡Pae0i = ¡[a2(11027+ 2884b ¡ 25293b 2+ 12158b 3¡
1472b 4)=2(11¡4b )2(109¡35b )2]< 0 for all b 2 [0;0:959536)). As a consequence, the share-
holding ratio by the owner i, i.e. (1¡b ), need to become higher in the managerial case than in the
entrepreneurial case to induce an agreement of the owner i on the merger between the public ﬁrm
0 and private ﬁrm i. In fact, as show in (20), the value of 1¡b must be larger than 0:456127, or
equivalently b smaller than 0:543873 in our managerial model, whereas b must be smaller than
0:56996 in the entrepreneurial case. However, as shown in (21), the owner of the public ﬁrm 0
never agrees on the merger as long as b is lower than 0:543873.
Although the market structures of the regime (b) with a 2 [a; a¯] blocks the mixed triopoly,
16
these market structures, as stated in (ii) of Claim (b), are blocked by those of the regime (c) with
b = 13 . By (18), (19), and the derivative of V
c
1 (b ), it is easily checked that this result also holds
for any b 2 ¡4773¡164p7776251 ; 13¤. The reasoning behind this result is explained as follows. Because
of the regime (b) is less competitive than the regime (a), social welfare which the owner of the
public ﬁrm 0 wants to maximize becomes lower than the level in regime (a). Consequently, while
the owners of the public ﬁrm 0 and private ﬁrm i in the regime (a) never reach an agreement on
the merger between these two ﬁrms, the owner of the public ﬁrm 0 in the regime (b) now has an
incentive to make a conciliatory offer to the owner of the private ﬁrm i on the merger of these two
ﬁrms, and they can reach an agreement on the merger.
Finally, Claim (d) shows that the market structures in the regime (d) are blocked by those
in the regime (c). This result is due to the fact that the positive effect of the improvement on
productivity in a merged ﬁrm is relatively smaller in the case of the shift from the regime (c) (or
(b)) into (d) than in the cases of the shift from (a) into (c) (or (b)). As a consequence, although
our deﬁnition of the inducibility among the market structures does not allow the case where the
market structure of the mixed triopoly is directly induced from those in the regime (d), it never
detracts the generality of our core analysis.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper examined a merger activity in the mixed oligopoly, especially focusing on the stability
of owners’ coalition formations. We introduced managerial delegation into the model of Kamaga
and Nakamura (2007) and examined the core of market structures, i.e. stable market structures.
In contrast to the result in Kamaga and Nakamura (2007), we obtained a striking but seriously
negative result that the core must be empty. In other words, none of the market structures is stable
in the sense that there always exists at least one owner who wants to deviate and induce a new
market structure.
In this paper, we assumed that ﬁrms’ managers set the outputs simultaneously. The interesting
17
extension of our model is to examine the case of Stackelberg competition in the second stage, i.e.
non-simultaneous moves of the managers. While such an extension is considered by Lambertini
(2000) in the model of private oligopoly, none of the existing works of mixed oligopoly analyzes
this type of extension in the context of managerial delegation. This is left for future research.
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Table 1: Firms’ proﬁt functions in each regime (r)
(r) proﬁt P ri
(a) Pai =
£
a¡ (q0+å2j=1 q j)
¤
qi¡ (qi)2 (i= 0;1;2)
(b) Pb0 =
£
a¡ (q0+q12)
¤
q0¡ (q0)2;
Pb12 =
£
a¡ (q0+q12)
¤
q12¡ (q12)2=2
(c) P c0i =
£
a¡ (q0i+q j)
¤
q0i¡ (q0i)2=2;
P cj =
£
a¡ (q0i+q j)
¤
q j¡ (q j)2 (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j)
(d) Pd012 = (a¡q012)q012¡ (q012)2=3
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Table 2: Owners’ (constituted) objectives in each regime (r)
(r) objective functionU ri
(a) Ua0 (q
a
0 ;q
a
1 ;q
a
2 ) =W
a
= (qma0 +å
2
j=1 q
ma
j )
2=2+Pa0 (q
ma)+å2j=1Paj (q
ma);
Uai (q
a
i ;q
a
0 ;q
a
j ) =P
a
i (q
ma) (i= 1;2; j 6= i)
(b) Ub0 (q
b
0 ;q
b
12) =W
b
= (qmb0 +q
mb
12 )
2=2+Pb0 (q
mb)+Pb12(q
mb);
Ub12(q
b
0 ;q
b
12) =P
b
12(q
mb)
(c) Uc0i(q
b
0i;q
b
j ) = bW
c+(1¡b )P c0i
= b
£
(qmc0i +q
mc
j )
2=2+P c0i(q
mc)+P cj (q
mc)
¤
+(1¡b )P c0i(qmc);
Ucj (q
b
0i;q
b
j ) =P
c
j (q
mc) (i; j = 1;2, j 6= i)
(d) Ud012(q
d
012) = gW
d +(1¡ g)Pd012
= g
£
(qmd012)
2=2+Pd012(q
md
012)
¤
+(1¡ g)Pd012(qmd012)
Table 3: Equilibrium incentive contracts in each regime (r)
(r) incentive contract q r¤i
(a) q a¤0 =
289
289+47a q
a¤
i =
289
289+20a (i= 1;2)
(b) q b¤0 =
7
7+a q
b¤
12 =
14
14+a
(c) q c¤0i =
109¡35b
109¡35b+a(8+20b ) q
c¤
j =
109¡35b
109¡35b+a(7¡3b ) (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j)
(d) q d¤012 =
8¡3g
8¡3g+3ag
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Table 4: Equilibrium outputs, proﬁts, and social welfare in each regime (r)
(r) equilibrium outcomes
(a) qa¤0 =
59
289a; q
a¤
i =
50
289a (i= 1;2) ;
P a¤0 =
4189
83521a
2; Pa¤i =
4000
83521a
2 (i= 1;2) ;
W a¤ = 49659167042a
2
(b) qb¤0 =
3
14a; q
b¤
12 =
2
7a;
P b¤0 =
3
49a
2; Pb¤12 =
5
49a
2;
W b¤ = 113392a
2
(c) qc¤0i =
2a(16¡b )
109¡35b ; q
c¤
j =
3a(7¡3b )
109¡35b ; (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j) ;
P c¤0i =
2a2(640¡408b+23b 2)
(109¡35b )2 ; P
c¤
j =
15a2(7¡3b )2
(109¡35b )2 (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j) ;
W c¤ = a
2(6839¡4058b+483b 2)
2(109¡35b )2
(d) qd¤012 =
3a
8¡3g ;
P d¤012 =
3a2(4¡3g)
(8¡3g)2 ;
W d¤ = 3a
2(11¡6g)
2(8¡3g)2
Table 5: Owners’ payoffs V ri in each regime (r)
(r) payoffs (V r0 ;V
r
1 ;V
r
2 )
(a)
³
V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2
´
=
³
W a¤; Pa¤1 ; P
a¤
2
´
(b)
³
V b0 ;V
b
1 ;V
b
2
´
=
³
W b¤; aPb¤12 ; (1¡a)Pb¤12
´
(c)
³
V c0 ;V
c
i ;V
c
j
´
=
³
W c¤; (1¡b )P c¤0i ; P c¤j
´
; (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j)
(d)
³
V d0 ;V
d
1 ;V
d
2
´
=
³
W d¤; (1¡ g)dPd¤012; (1¡ g)(1¡d )Pd¤012
´
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